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Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? A right to do wrong is a right that others
not interfere with the right-holder’s wrongdoing. It is a right against enforcement of
duty, that is a right that others not interfere with one’s violation of one’s own
obligations. The strongest reason for moral rights to do moral wrong is grounded in
the value of personal autonomy. Having a measure of protected choice (that is a
right) to do wrong is a condition for an autonomous life and for autonomous moral
self-constitution. This view has its critics. Responding to these objections reveals
that none refute the coherence of the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral wrong.’
At most, some objections successfully challenge the weight and frequency of the
personal autonomy reasons for such rights. Autonomy-based moral rights to do
moral wrong are therefore conceptually possible as well as, at least on occasion,
actual.

I. INTRODUCTION

My concern here is with the concept of a ‘moral right to do moral
wrong.’ The dialectical stance of the article is defensive, trying to
make a case for the normative grounds as well as for the coherence of
the concept of a ‘right to do wrong’ in response to various objections
raised against it. The article opens with an introduction of the concept
of a ‘right to do wrong,’ exploring its meaning and arguing for its
coherence. The article then turns to its primary concern, which is
reflecting on the normative grounds of the right to do wrong. The
primary question the article attempts to answer is that given that the
idea of a right to do wrong is conceptually coherent, do such rights
ever arise in morality. After introducing the best liberal justification
for such rights – a justification grounded in the value of personal
autonomy – and exploring and tentatively rejecting a competing
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justification – grounded in personal integrity – the article develops the
idea of a liberal autonomy-based moral right to do moral wrong and
assesses how this idea fares against objections raised in the literature.
II. A RIGHT TO DO WRONG

Having a right to do wrong entails that the right-holder has a claim on
others against their interference with the right-holder’s -ing
regardless of whether or not the right-holder is permitted to (where
‘’ stands for an active verb).The idea of a right to do wrong
assumes a view of rights as protected choice;2 in the case of a right to
do wrong the choice is between right and wrong. A right to do wrong
protects the right-holder’s wrongdoing from external interference,3
such that if a holder of a right to who is also under a duty not to 
chooses to others are under a correlated duty not to interfere with
the right-holder’s -ing.
Examples of moral rights to do moral wrong that are common in the
literature are one’s moral rights not to offer easy rescue to those in
danger, not to give money to charity, not to help a friend in need, to
exercise one’s moral right to free speech in order to insult others, and
one’s moral right to support a racist political party. All these
examples assume a moral duty one nevertheless enjoys a moral right
to violate. Late-term abortion is another example: some are of the
opinion that late-term abortion – that is aborting after the fetus has
become sentient – is morally wrong, but nevertheless are also of the
opinion that women have the (moral) right to decide to undergo such
an abortion without external interference.
Notice that while a right to do wrong must correspond to some duty in
others, it need not necessarily correspond to the ‘negative’ duty of
non-interference. Conceptually, a right may also correlate to
‘positive’ duties to facilitate, enable, and realize what one has a right
to.4 The scope and nature (‘positive’ or ‘negative’) of actual rights

1

William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), pp. 133‐35.
2
Edmundson, id. at 135.
3
Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong”, Ethics 92(1) (1981): pp. 21‐39, 29.
4
See Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice‐Hall, 1973), pp.
59‐60; Alon Harel, “Theories of Rights”, in Martin P. Golding and William A.
Edmundson (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory
(Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), pp. 191‐206, 192.
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depend not on the concept of ‘right’ but on the norms giving rise to
those rights. For example, the (moral) right to vote for a racist party
is a right to do wrong which has corresponding ‘negative’ duties on
others not to interfere with one’s voting – such as the duty not to
block the right-holder’s access to the voting booth – as well as
affirmative duties to facilitate the right-holder’s voting – such as the
duty to provide the racist voter with a voting ballot. For reasons of
economy, I will mainly use the ‘negative’ language of ‘noninterference.’
Conceptually, the idea of a right to do wrong is most interesting and
puzzling in cases of a right of one kind to do a wrong of the same
kind. How can there be a right (e.g., a moral right) to do what one is
under a (moral) duty not to do? And moreover, if one is under a duty
of one kind (e.g., moral) not to how can others owe one a duty (of
the same kind, i.e., moral) not to interfere with one’s -ing? William
Godwin aptly expressed the sense of perplexity surrounding the idea
of a right to do wrong, writing that “[t]here cannot be a more absurd
proposition than that which affirms the right of doing wrong.”5
This sense of perplexity is, nevertheless, easily dispelled. First,
conceptually there is an analytical space for a right to do wrong. In
Hohfeldian terms the presumed moral right to do moral wrong is best
conceived of as a claim-right.6 A claim-right to  entails a claim
against interference by others with one’s -ing that corresponds to a
duty in others not to interfere with one’s -ing. A privilege (or
liberty) to entails a freedom to r, more accurately, having no
duty not to Normally claim-rights are accompanied by a privilege,
so that if one has a claim-right to one is also privileged (or at
liberty) to (or not to )For example, my right that others not
censor my ideas is normally coupled with a privilege (or liberty) to
express those ideas. Conceptually, however, it is possible to have a

5

William Godwin, “Enquiry Concerning Political Justice”, in K. Codell Carter (ed.)
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 88.
6
In Hohfeldian terms, as characterized here, the moral right to do wrong is best
conceived of as a claim‐right and not a liberty/privilege. This is so even though the
right to do wrong is presented as a right to do something (), which appears to
have the structure of a Hohfeldian privilege. The essence of the right to do wrong
is that the right‐holder is not privileged to  yet has a claim on others (who have a
corresponding duty) that they not interfere with the right‐holder’s –ing. On this
see Robert P. George, Making Men Moral (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993), pp. 118‐22.
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claim-right to such that others are under a correlative duty not to
interfere with one’s -ing, and still lack the liberty to  (i.e., have a
duty not to The category of a claim-right without privilege opens
the door for the possibility of a right to do wrong.8 In the example of
late-term abortion these categories play out as follows: late-term
abortion is presumably morally wrong so that women are not
privileged to have them performed, although women do have a claimright that others not interfere with their decision to undergo such a
procedure.
Second, normatively the mere fact that someone is engaged in
wrongdoing does not necessarily mandate or even permit others to
interfere with one’s wrongdoing.9 While the wrongness of one’s
actions is perhaps a reason for others to interfere, often other
(weightier) reasons arise against such interference. Therefore, the fact
that one’s actions are wrongful does not necessarily entail that
normatively one cannot have a right – the function of which is to
forbid the interference of others – to perform them. And while not all
reasons against interference need also be reasons for a right against
such interference, some such reasons certainly may (reasons for a
right are not merely reasons for a duty of non-interference with A’s ing but also for A to hold a correlative claim against such
interference).
Third, and perhaps most importantly, a right to do wrong does not
bear on the rightness or wrongness of the actions the right-holder is
free to perform; it only bars others from interfering with such actions.
Thus, while rights to do wrong give others reason not to interfere with

7

See Matthew H. Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings”, in Matthew H. Kramer, N.E.
Simmonds & Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights (Oxford and New York: Clarendon
Press, 1998), p. 15; Edmundson, supra note 1, at 94, 135. For a strongly related
position see Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
pp. 222‐25.
8

Notice that this Hohfeldian account of the logic and normative structure of rights
to do wrong is an explication of the Hohfeldian categories. It is not an account of
Hohfeld’s views on the coherence of the category of a ‘right to do wrong.’ The
argument here is that the Hohfeldian building blocks allow for the category of a
‘right to do wrong.’ This position is indifferent as to whether or not the category of
a ‘right to do wrong’ ever occurred to Hohfeld himself or whether or not he
considered the category coherent.
9

Waldron, supra note 3, at 28‐31.
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the right-holder’s wrongdoing, they do not give reason for the rightholder herself to do (or not to do) wrongIt is the essence of the right
to do wrong that what the right-holder is protected to do is not
necessarily the right thing to do. One should avoid the impulse to
associate a right to do with the rightness of -ing as well as to
equate the reasons for a right to with the reasons for -ing.10 What
one should keep in mind is that rights matter most in protecting the
interests and choices of right-holders from external interference, and
not in validating or justifying those interests and choices. The main
function of rights (certainly liberal rights) is, in other words, to protect
the interests of right-holders and to assure individuals a realm of
protected choice and a measure of freedom.11
Finally, notice that although I often refer to ‘a right to do wrong’ I do
not mean to refer to a pervasive right to do any and all wrong. Such a
moral right is prima facie implausible. It is likely that morality does
not afford a right to do, for example, particularly egregious wrongs.

10

If I follow his reasoning correctly, Gerhard Øverland’s recent critique of the
concept of a ‘right to do wrong’ does just that: conflates reasons for a right with
reasons for how to exercise the right. Gerhard Øverland, “The Right to Do Wrong”,
Law and Philosophy 26(4) (2007): pp. 377‐404, 385‐89. Øverland concludes that
there can be no right to do wrong. Because where the reasons in favor of a right
protecting A’s ‐ing are sufficiently strong to overcome the competing reasons
against the right, Øverland believes that it is also the case that due to the same
weighing of reasons there is no longer any wrong for there to be a right to do. In
other words, if there are weighty enough moral reasons to allow A to  without
interference then it follows that A’s ‐ing is not wrongful, because there are
overriding moral reasons for allowing A to . Yet, as just explained, a reason for a
right protecting one’s ‐ing is not necessarily also a reason for exercising that right
in any specific way. That is, such a reason is not a reason to , but merely a reason
that one have the protected choice to .
11
David Enoch has offered a compelling proof of the conceptual coherence of the
right to do wrong, or as he calls it, “a right to violate one’s duty.” In broad terms,
what Enoch demonstrates is that the assumption that there is never a right to do
wrong yields substantive results to rights theory under all three leading theories of
rights: Hohfeldian, Will Theory, and Interest Theory. That this assumption has
substantive results for rights entails that the assumption – that there is no right to
do wrong – is not a conceptual truth, but a matter of substantive morality. If it
were conceptually true that there is never a right to do wrong, then assuming it
would yield purely conceptual results to a theory of rights and not any substantive
normative results. If a substantive result follows from a certain proposition, it
follows that that proposition is not a conceptual truth. Therefore, a right to do
wrong is conceptually possible. David Enoch, “A Right to Violate One’s Duty”, Law
and Philosophy 21(4/5) (2002): pp. 367‐78, 361.
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There is, however, more to morality than the great wrongs of the
world. In fact, the chief habitat of morality is in the contours of
everyday life, in which rights to do wrong are probably the most
pervasive. The question then is whether, and if so when, do people
hold a moral right to do some moral wrong.
III. THE LIBERAL GROUNDS OF A MORAL RIGHT TO DO MORAL
WRONG

Given that a right to do wrong is conceptually coherent, what sort of
reasons are there for the actuality of such rights? First, as explained
above, such reasons are reasons for barring others from interfering
with wrongdoing, or, in other words, reasons against the enforcement
of duty. Second, where a set of reasons gives rise to a right to do
wrong some such reasons must somehow be for the right-holder. A
right to do wrong may also arise from reasons external to the interests
or liberty of the right-holder. Yet, no right can arise from purely
external reasons. The claim that “[t]here might be rights to do wrong,
which are not for the sake of the wrongdoer”12 contradicts, I think, an
essential feature of rights: that they are for the right-holder. This, I
believe, is the case under both leading theories on what rights are for.
Under the Interest (or Benefit) Theory of rights, rights are for the
well-being of the right-holder.13 While the justification of a right
need not solely rely on the significance the protected interests of the
right-holder have for him or her, some of the reasons for the right
must be situated in the well-being of the right-holder.14 Where the
reasons against interference are not in any way for or supportive of
the wrongdoer’s well-being, the wrongdoer may be free to do wrong
12

Øverland, supra note 10, at 379.
The Interest Theory of rights views rights as protectors of right‐holders’ interests
or well‐being. See Harel, supra note 4, at p. 195; Edmundson, supra note 1, at pp.
120‐22.
14
Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford and New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994), pp. 149‐51. Obviously often the importance of one’s right is much
greater than the importance, for the right‐holder, of the particular interest of the
right‐holder that is protected by the right. Consider the following example:
imagine two people with an equal interest in having a particular shirt. It is clear
that the one who legally owns the shirt should have a right to it. But as their
interest gives them equal claim to the shirt, this can only be because the right‐
holder’s ownership of the shirt is a reason for giving it to him that is greater than
his interest in the shirt. His (moral) right to the shirt does not, therefore, merely
reflect his interest in the shirt, but adds to it an additional independent reason
based on the importance of protecting legal property rights.
13
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in the sense that there is a duty on others not to interfere, yet under
such circumstances the wrongdoer’s freedom to do wrong would not
derive from her right to such freedom.
According to the Choice (or Will) Theory of rights, rights are for the
right-holder in that they are protective of her freedom or autonomy.15
In a sense, the Choice Theory is a sub-category of the Interest
Theory.16
Under a Choice Theory of rights reasons against
interference with wrongdoing only establish a right of the wrongdoer
against such interference if those reasons justify giving the wrongdoer
the power or discretion to decide whether to enforce the right or to
relinquish it and consent to the interference.17 Under the Choice
Theory a normative constellation not exhibiting such an empowering
and protection of the would-be right-holder’s freedom and autonomy
simply does not comprise a right. Where the reasons for noninterference are purely external to the wrongdoer – not for giving the
wrongdoer any control over others’ duty of non-interference – they
may provide for the side-effect of freedom to wrong with impunity,
but such reasons do not grant the wrongdoer the right to do wrong
with impunity.
A. Personal Autonomy
The most promising ideal taken as a reason for a right to do wrong –
in the sense of how such rights are for the right-holder – is grounded
in the value of personal autonomy.18 And it is the view I develop and
defend here. The liberal ideal of personal autonomy is that

15

According to the Will (or Choice) Theory of rights, rights protect the right‐
holder’s exercise of choice, inherently concerned with the right‐holder’s freedom
and autonomy. See Harel, supra note 4, at pp. 194‐95; Edmundson, supra note 1,
at 119‐20, 122‐32.
16
See Raz, supra note 14, at 149‐50 n. 10; Edmundson, supra note 1, at 127.
17
Edmundson, supra note 1, at 144; Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Rights”,
Philosophy and Public Affairs 33(3) (2005): pp. 223‐52, 238.
18
In his 1981 essay on the right to do wrong Waldron refers to “personal integrity”
and not to ‘autonomy’ as the source of the significance of the right to do wrong.
Yet, much in Waldron’s argument seems nevertheless better aligned with the idea
of autonomy. Supra note 3, at 34‐5. Moreover, in a short piece from 1983
Waldron explicitly refers to “autonomy” as the grounding value of his conception
of a right to do wrong. Jeremy Waldron, “Galston on Rights”, Ethics (93)(2) (1983):
pp. 325‐37, 326. David Enoch also endorses the autonomy‐based account of a
right to do wrong. Enoch, supra note 11, at 379‐80.

8
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individuals possess a measure of self-governance and selfdetermination over their lives and identity. As Joseph Raz puts it,
[t]he ruling idea behind the idea of personal autonomy is that people should
make their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own
life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to
some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions
19
throughout their lives.

And,
20

[a]utonomy means that a good life is a life of free creation.

Gerald Dworkin’s formulation is also illuminating:
autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of persons to reflect
critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, and so forth and
the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of higher-order
preferences and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their
nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take responsibility for
the kind of person they are.21

In short, autonomy is self-sovereignty, self-constitution, selfformation, self-definition, and self-determination of one’s life and
identity.22
Certain actions and decisions individuals make are self-defining or
self-constituting in this sense. Self-defining choices may maintain or
steer a person’s life in a certain direction or put it on a particular
trajectory. Moreover, such choices are formative of ‘who one is’ in
that through them one defines or determines aspects and attributes of
him- or herself, which are central to one’s identity. The liberal
tradition has identified a number of typical realms of choice that are
often particularly important for personal autonomy and selfconstitution. These include choices of political affiliation and
activity, intimate relations, public expression of opinion, association,

19

Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press,
1986), p. 369.
20
Id., at 412.
21
Gerald Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), p. 20.
22
In what follows I use these terms interchangeably with ‘autonomy.’
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commitments, values, occupation, and life-projects.23 Now of course
no single choice is determinate of one’s autonomy, but these are the
type of choices and realm of choices in which freedom of choice is
typically considered crucial for an autonomous life. There are
certainly others.
According to liberal morality those aspects of people’s lives, which
are often partially determinative of ‘who one is,’ are uniquely
valuable (or of disvalue) when freely chosen, because as such they
contribute to an autonomous life. Thus, all other things being equal,
even if valuable in and of themselves, where values, virtues,
commitments, affiliations, life-projects, etc. are externally imposed,
lesser value is generated than when freely chosen. Moreover, many
such values are, by their own lights, only valuable if engaged in
autonomously. In instances involving self-constituting moral choices
there is a significant difference in value between doing right out of
choice and doing right out of coercion, compulsion, or the deterring
effect of expected sanction. Accordingly, liberal rights arise to assure
that these various identity-forming attributes, be they attachments,
associations, personal relations, values, political actions, public
expressions, moral character and so on are freely chosen and formed,
at least to a degree. As such, the moral ground for liberal rights is
instrumental: they are rights in the service of personal autonomy,
requiring that individuals have sufficient freedom of choice, both in
kind and in number, between self-constituting options.
Still, how does the value of autonomy ground a right to make morally
wrongful choices? This question appears to persist even having
accepted that autonomy mandates a sufficient measure of freedom to
choose from various options that are significantly related to
individuals’ steering of the course of their own lives and to the
formation of their own identity. The most appealing answer is that
without a right to do wrong individuals would not have sufficient
‘breathing room’ to autonomously determine ‘who they are.’ Selfforming choices are often value-laden, and values often evoke moral
issues. A person’s freedom to make morally sensitive choices, which
are often among the choices that matter most for self-constitution, is
essential to any rich and meaningful autonomous self-formation.
And, the argument goes, having a right to choose wrongfully is a
condition for having the autonomy over such morally saturated issues

23

See e.g., Waldron, supra note 3, at 34‐35.
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and aspects of life or, more generally, it is a condition for an
autonomous life. As such, the right to do wrong is a liberal right.
This conception of the liberal right to do wrong has been subjected to
forceful criticism. Explaining and developing these critiques and
attempting to assess how the liberal right to do wrong fairs in relation
to them is the focus of Section IV. But before turning to assessing
and defending the autonomy argument for rights to do wrong, we
must assess the viability of a competing value for the normative
grounds of such rights.
B. Personal Integrity
Some view personal integrity as the primary value giving reason for
rights to do wrong. One proponent of this position is Robert
George.24 Jeremy Waldron too refers to “personal integrity” as the
value furthered by a right to do wrong.25 Following John Finnis,
George appears to view the value of personal integrity as the ideal of
having a coherent and harmonious identity and sense of self.26
According to this position it is people’s interest in integrity that
requires affording individuals the protected choice to act in
furtherance of their integrity, even if doing so may require
wrongdoing.
I however doubt whether, as a conceptual matter, personal integrity –
as just described – can function as a reason for a right that has the
structure of a protected choice, such as the right to do wrong. As
explained above, a reason for a right to do wrong is not a reason to do
wrong but rather a reason for having a protected choice to do wrong.
An integrity reason for a right to do wrong therefore must have the
form of a reason for having the protected choice (i.e., a right) to do
evil as one’s integrity mandates. I do not believe that personal
integrity functions as such a reason.

24

George, supra note 6, at 124‐25.
Yet, as explained above, although his position is not entirely clear much in
Waldron’s discussion of personal integrity is actually in line with the ideal of
autonomy. See supra note 18. Andrew Cohen also appears to count integrity
among the grounds of the right to do wrong. Andrew I. Cohen, “Virtues,
Opportunities, and the Right to Do Wrong”, Journal of Social Philosophy 28(2)
(1997): pp. 43‐55.
26
George, supra note 6, at p. 24. For Finnis, integrity is an aspect of the more
general basic value of what he calls “practical‐reasonableness.” John Finnis,
Natural Rights and Natural Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), pp. 88‐9.
25
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Consider the following example. A person is said to hold a right to
(wrongfully) side with a bigoted cause because the values the cause
stands for are imbedded in that person’s beliefs, values, religion,
personal history, core communal attachments, and social
commitments, and because failing to side with the bigoted cause
would greatly erode and clash with those core aspects of that person’s
identity. The presumed reason for this person holding a right to side
with bigotry without interference is that were the person prevented
from taking this stance, perverse as it may be, it would result in a
substantial detriment to his or her identity and sense of self. That is, it
would erode this person’s integrity. In the cases in which the reasons
for acting in furtherance of one’s integrity prevail over competing
reasons for action, what I suspect we will find is that the wrongness of
one’s presumed wrongdoing in siding with a bigoted cause is
outweighed by the severity of the damage to one’s integrity (for
example, some deep crisis in one’s deeply held religious beliefs were
one prevented from acting as one’s integrity mandates). The point
being that the reason not to interfere with the bigot’s conduct is that
under the circumstances he is, all things considered, doing as value
requires. Where the presumed disvalue found in the loss of integrity
is greater than the disvalue of acting in furtherance of other values,
one should act in furtherance of integrity. And, following the same
value calculus and assuming away external reasons for interference,
others should not interfere with the agent’s actions in furtherance of
his or her integrity.
If true, this points to a deep conceptual problem with grounding rights
to do wrong in the value of personal integrity. Namely, integrity
seems unable to justify a right to do wrong. Integrity appears to
function as a reason for an action and not as a reason for a right to
choose that action. Because if the integrity reasons for -ing
outweigh the reasons against -ing there are conclusive reasons to 
as well as (excluding, in favor of simplification, any external reasons)
not to interfere with one’s justified -ing. Φ-ing under these
circumstances is not wrongful but justified. So while integrity gives
reason to and for non-interference with one’s -ing it does not give
reason for a right to do wrong, because when such reasons prevail ing appears justified.
Moreover, following this line of reasoning it is not clear to me
whether personal integrity is indeed at all a reason for a right to do
(regardless of the question of whether or not -ing is a wrong). As
already explained, a reason for a right to is not a reason to but
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rather a reason for affording the right-holder, through noninterference, the freedom to or not to as she chooses. Preserving
and furthering one’s integrity through one’s own actions does not
necessarily require that one freely choose those actions. Rather, it
simply requires that one act in furtherance of one’s own integrity.
Where -ing is crucial for one’s integrity, integrity is a reason for ing that suggests some goodness in -ing as well as a reason for
others not to interfere with one’s -ing, but it is not necessarily a
reason for giving one the right to The right to is the right to
choose without interference whether to or not to . And, it is not
clear to me why one’s integrity-interests in -ing would function as a
reason for allowing one to choose not only to but also not to
especially where not -ing is detrimental to one’s integrity.
Integrity, as defined above, does not mandate choice and autonomy,27
and therefore where one’s integrity is a reason for one to  and that
others not interfere with one’s -ing it is not a reason that one have
the choice to  (and by extension not to ) and that others not
interfere with one’s not -ing. In other words, integrity may be a
reason to but it is not a reason for a right to .28
Notice that this refutation of the integrity account (as defined above)
of moral rights to do moral wrong is not applicable against the
autonomy account for such rights. Autonomy reasons are reasons for
affording the agent (of whom it is the autonomy of) a right to choose
how to act. In contrast, as just explained, integrity reasons give the
agent (of whom it is the integrity of) reasons for how to act.
Autonomy reasons are reasons for others not to infringe on the
freedom of the person it is the autonomy of. Such reasons do not bear
on how one should exercise the protected freedom of choice one has,
but only that one should hold a right to make such choices freely. In
contrast, as we just saw, integrity reasons give reason for action not
only to others (not to setback and/or further one’s integrity) but also
to the person it is the integrity of. Integrity reasons are reasons for
one to act as one’s integrity mandates.
27

Autonomy, in contrast, may require a measure of integrity. See Raz, supra note
19, at 381‐85.
28
I see one exception to my position. Where –ing is a condition for preserving
personal integrity, reasons of integrity may support a right to  where such a right
is practically the best path to assure that one actually s. In such cases integrity
gives instrumental reasons for a right to . This is unlike the autonomy‐
justification for a right to  where the interest in having a choice directly grounds
the right.
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Relatedly, unlike integrity reasons, autonomy reasons for a protected
choice to are not reasons that bear on the rightness or wrongness of
-ing. Thus, where autonomy reasons prevail in giving rise to a right
to it does not necessarily follow that -ing is morally right. Which
is why autonomy reasons can give rise to a right to do wrong. In
contrast, as we saw above, where integrity reasons for allowing one to
prevail over competing reasons it follows that -ing is justified,
which is why such reasons cannot give rise to a right to do wrong.
IV. ASSESSING THE RIGHT TO DO WRONG: HOW MUCH CHOICE IS
REQUIRED?

A. The Demands of Autonomy
Having laid out the conceptual and normative foundations of a liberal
autonomy-based right to do wrong, I now turn to assessing whether
this right survives the objections raised against it in the literature. My
focus here is on defending and assessing the viability of the normative
liberal grounds for rights to do wrong.
Must individuals have rights to violate their moral duties in order to
have a sufficient array of morally permissible self-constituting choices
to satisfy the demands of autonomy? Another way of putting the
issue is to ask whether the range and scope of the self-constitutive
choices individuals presumably have – even in the absence of rights to
do wrong – satisfy the demands of personal autonomy?
Waldron’s position suggests that they do not.29 Waldron explains that
characteristically the spectrum of choice open to individuals
comprises options that are (a) morally called for, (b) subject to moral
criticism, and (c) options to which morality is indifferent.30
According to Waldron, in the absence of a right to do wrong rights
would only protect choice between morally permissible options,
which would result in rights protecting only morally permissible
choices. This would result in individuals having no morally protected
freedom of choice in matters touching on morality. Because,
according to Waldron, in a universe without rights to do wrong,
whenever faced with a set of morally permissible choices, one choice
– the one morally called for – would dominate all other choices, in
effect making all other options morally impermissible and leaving

29
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Waldron, supra note 3, at 31‐7.
For purposes of simplification Waldron brackets supererogatory options.
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individuals with no course of action but for the morally dominating
option, effectively affording individuals no choice at all. In such a
universe freedom of choice would only persist where the possible
options do not involve morality (so that no one choice can come to
morally dominate all others). The worry is that considering the
unique significance and centrality moral issues play in people’s lives,
personal autonomy cannot flourish where people lack any freedom of
choice in such matters.
William Galston and George are critical of Waldron’s argument.31
According to them having a set of options that are undominated (i.e.,
none are morally inferior) yet still all morally permissible is a
common feature of morality. Accordingly, Waldron is naïve to think
that there is typically a morally called for option that therefore
dominates all other options. Galston and George seem to believe that
the realm of what is morally permissible normally contains an array of
options that are in some sense incommensurate, incomparable, or are
equally good (the latter would be cases of ‘ties at the top’). For
example, individuals may choose between different and even
contradicting morally permissible yet mutually incomparable,
undominated, and unranked (in order of moral priority) religious
paths, political forms of activism, commitments, attachments,
personal relationships, social affiliations, professions, forms of life
etc. Rights that are protective of such vast arrays of options assure
individuals a wide range of self-constituting sets of choices, providing
for conditions that easily satisfy the demands of personal autonomy.
Much here turns on whether one recognizes the pervasiveness of
incommensurability and incomparability in people’s potential options.
My sentiments are with those who view incommensurability or
incomparability as a significant aspect of life and of the nature of
value.32 Yet this is a contested position.33 Accordingly, assuming
such pervasive incommensurability or incomparability, there is reason

31

Williiam A. Galston, “On the Alleged Right to Do Wrong: A Response to
Waldron”, Ethics 93(2) (1983): pp. 320‐24, at 321‐23; George, supra note 6, at 126‐
28.
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Agency,” in R. Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical
Reason (Cambridge M.A. and London: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 110‐28.
33
For a compelling argument and a critical survey of different views favoring the
position that incomparability is a common feature of value, see Ruth Chang,
“Introduction,” in Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason, Id.,
at 1‐34.
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to think that morality provides individuals with a sufficiently rich
plethora of choices to satisfy the demands of autonomy without
allowing right-holders to choose to do wrong.
Are these self-constituting choices, which individuals presumably
may have even in the absence of rights to do wrong, indeed enough?
Clearly, all other things being equal, a world with a right to do wrong
offers individuals more options than a world without such a right, the
rich array of choices Galston and George argue for notwithstanding.
But this observation does not entail that the autonomy argument for a
right to do wrong necessarily survives its critics.
It seems sensible to postulate that there is a threshold beyond which
having more choice adds little to nothing to individual autonomy.
More choice does not, in other words, always entail more autonomy.
In fact, at times more choice is too much choice, adversely affecting
individuals’ freedom34 and ability to deliberate and choose rationally
in ways that foster autonomy.35 It seems reasonable to argue that
even prior to reaching this threshold of saturation in terms of a
number or complexity of choices, the weight of the demands of
personal autonomy decreases with the growth in the number and
variety of self-constituting choices people have. The autonomy
reasons for a right to do wrong are weightier in relation to assuring
individuals few self-constituting choices than they are in relation to
assuring that individuals have more such choices. And the crux of
Galston and George’s position is that individuals have a wide range of
important choices even without a right to do wrong. For example,
George points out that even within highly restrictive worldviews on
personal morality, such as traditional forms of Christianity or
Judaism, people are still left with a range of morally permitted options
that are enough to fill a whole lifetime with self-constituting
choices.36
Whether or not autonomy calls for a right to do wrong depends on
various contingent circumstances determinative of both the type
(different aspects of self-constitution may require different types of
choices) and range (how much choice one has of each type) of self-
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constituting choices individuals happen to have. And, factual
circumstances may vary with time and place and between individuals.
Under some circumstances the autonomy argument may ground
certain rights to do wrong and in other circumstances, in which
circumstances allow for a range of morally permissible options
sufficient for meaningful self-constitution, autonomy reasons lack
sufficient weight to ground such rights.
While powerful, Galston and George’s counter to the autonomy
argument is therefore not a knockdown argument. Whether or not a
certain person has a right to perform a certain wrong largely depends
on the contingent circumstances. It is hard to demonstrate that a
sufficient range or choice – both in number and type – always exists.
Yet, if what the value of autonomy calls for is a wide range of paths
and forms of life to choose from, it seems that at least in some social
circumstances (although not in all) people can do without rights to do
wrong, at least in relation to some aspects of their lives.
B. Autonomy as Moral Self-Constitution
But there are autonomy reasons for a right to do wrong that the
various morally permissible choices Galston and George point to
cannot satisfy, categorically. Having a right to choose to do wrong
contributes uniquely to personal autonomy through its contribution to
moral self-constitution. A central aspect of self-constitution turns on
autonomously determining the nature of one’s moral self: whether –
in relation to the various aspects of morality – one is virtuous or
wicked, good or evil, moral or immoral. Such moral self-constitution
is only possible if one is afforded the freedom to make morally wrong
choices. Simplistically put, being good is only a meaningful or
autonomous choice – in terms of the self-constitution of one’s moral
self – if one has some freedom to choose to be bad. The autonomous
self-development of an integral moral (or immoral) identity mandates
therefore allowing a measure of choice between good and evil, right
and wrong, virtue and vice.37 It calls, in other words, for a right to do
(at least some) wrong. Rights that only protect choices spanning
between the paths of the saint (the supererogatory), the righteous (the
moral person), and the mere ‘good egg’ (the non-evil person) fall
short of securing the range of choice required for moral selfconstitution. To put the idea crudely and running the risk of sounding
like a televangelist, in order to truly constitute oneself as morally
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good, individuals must be allowed some opportunity to choose to
become bad, which requires having a choice to do (at least some)
wrong. For example, accepting that charity is morally right and that
there is a moral duty to show a measure of charity, had one lacked the
right to violate this duty one could become a charitable person, but
could one truly self-constitute oneself as a charitable person?
Note that moral self-constitution requires a range of moral choices
that are, to a degree, recurring. No single choice or even type of
choice between a wrongful option and a moral option is determinative
in forming one into a moral or a wicked person. Also, one may be
moral in some respects in relation to certain issues and not to others.
And, different choices may contribute to forming such different
aspects of one’s moral nature. Moreover, there is a cumulative aspect
to choices that form one’s moral makeup. How one faces a single
moral dilemma does not determine one’s moral self. In addition, an
individual’s moral character may change and fluctuate throughout
life, requiring one to reaffirm or restore one’s moral character. Thus,
a measure of various wrongful choices is needed throughout one’s life
to assure the opportunity for moral self-constitution.
Still, one should avoid overstating the point. Although having more
than a single choice between good and evil is required for moral
autonomy, there is a threshold of moral choice beyond which having a
greater number of choices makes little difference to moral selfconstitution. In addition, clearly one need not have a choice to do all
types of wrongs in order to have sufficient range of moral choices for
moral self-constitution. Finally, one’s autonomy interests in a right to
do wrong are most likely never weighty enough to justify a right to
highly egregious wrongdoing.
George argues that even assuming individuals indeed have a
genuinely unique autonomy-driven interest in a freedom to choose to
do wrong, such an interest does not give rise to a right to do wrong.
According to him even without a right to do wrong individuals
normally enjoy sufficient opportunities to choose evil over virtue
without interference.38 George does not offer an example, yet one
possible scenario is that occasionally others are under a duty not to
interfere with one’s wrongdoing, where the duty is sufficiently
supported by reasons wholly unrelated to one’s interests in having the
freedom to do wrong. Morality here may prescribe sufficient freedom
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to choose wrong even without providing for a right to do so. For
example, even assuming that lying is morally wrong, the moral and
administrative costs of enforcing a ban on lying would be morally
prohibitive. The moral reasons prohibiting such a ban may have
nothing to do with people’s interests in lying, yet will of course have
the effect of offering a measure of freedom, even if not a right, to lie.
A related argument against the right to do wrong is that even without
a duty of non-interference with other people’s wrongdoing many
choices to do wrong would go unchecked and even unnoticed. And,
again, where individuals enjoy a sufficient degree of freedom to do
wrong, the reasons from moral autonomy for a right to do wrong are
satisfied or are at least diminished, becoming too weak to support a
right to do wrong. A position George advocates and that Joseph Raz
may be interpreted to hold.39
It is, however, worth noticing that such a de facto freedom to do
wrong may offer less in terms of furthering personal autonomy than a
right to do wrong. One has de facto freedom to do wrong where
others are under a duty not to so interfere with one’s wrongdoing or
even when others, who may be permitted and even obligated to
interfere, just happen not to. Yet such duty or factual lack of
interference do not provide for the same measure of freedom to do
wrong as does a right against such interference. The cutting edge of
the right to do wrong is that it gives the right-holder a moral claim to
enforce the duty of non-interference on others. Autonomy has a
subjective component to it, by which I mean to point out that in order
to be autonomous people must believe and, in some sense, feel that
they are autonomous. Lacking a right to violate their duty, it is not
unlikely that some individuals will be nevertheless reticent to consider
violating the duty or will not feel free to do so even if enjoying a de
facto freedom to violate their duty. As is demonstrated in the
numerous instances of people invoking their rights to against
allegations of their wrongdoing through -ing, rights often have a
strong liberating and insulating (even if not justifying) effect. Having
a right tends to assure individuals some measure of empowerment to
ignore the judgment of others and to feel that the choice of whether or
not to do wrong really is subject to their own judgment. The feeling
of freedom is partially determinate of freedom, and what people feel
is not purely determined by reason. Rights of course do not always
have such empowering psychological effects, but when they do I
39
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believe that they offer a sense of freedom that is hospitable for
personal autonomy to a degree that is less found in circumstances of a
mere de facto freedom. Moreover, there are also epistemological
factors at play here. Individuals enjoying a de facto freedom to do
wrong are not necessarily aware of it or of its extent and reliability,
and may therefore still fear reprisal. Thus, if the freedom to choose
wrong uniquely fosters moral self-constitution, then mere opportunity
to do wrong, as opposed to a right to do wrong, may not always
suffice to realize the autonomy-based value of moral self-constitution.
Once again, therefore, whether or not the demands of personal
autonomy are weighty enough to give rise to a right to do wrong
depends on factual circumstances and not on analysis. Perhaps
ironically it seems that the more efficient one’s environment is in
terms of imposing morality and moral character, the fewer
opportunities to choose to do wrong one has and the more weighty the
autonomy reasons for a right to do wrong become. Moreover, as
claimed above, different types of choices to do wrong may contribute
differently to one’s moral self, which, depending on variations in the
social enforcement of such duties, may suggest having a right to do
certain wrongs and not others.
C. The Value of Autonomous Wrongdoing
The argument I just endorsed based on the importance rights to do
wrong have for moral self-constitution faces another objection, based
on the presumed disvalue of autonomous wrongdoing. Yet, although
formidable, I believe this objection is surmountable.
George claims that autonomy does not ground a right to do wrong
because, and here he relies on Raz, “autonomy is valuable only if
exercised in pursuit of the good.”40 For Raz, it seems that there is
actually more disvalue in choosing or acting badly where the choice
or action involves higher degrees of autonomy.41 Wrongdoing that is
not autonomous is somehow less bad. I concur. Raz does not directly
discuss the issue of a right to do wrong, but the presumed Razian
objection to the right to do wrong is that if what grounds the right is
the value of autonomy and accepting that autonomous pursuit of the
bad is, at best, valueless, it appears that the right to do wrong has no
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normative legs to stand on.42 If autonomy embodied in or achieved
through exercising the right to do wrong is indeed valueless – or even
of a disvalue – what then is the point of such a right? Autonomy does
not, according to Raz, justify wrongdoing and therefore, it seems to
follow, autonomy cannot justify a right to do wrong. Thus, the
objection appears to lead to concluding that the value of personal
autonomy may only ground a right to do what is morally permitted.
One partial response to this objection is to point out that autonomous
wrongdoing may further good in the long run. Doing wrong and later
coming to regret it and learning from one’s errors is not an unfamiliar
path towards moral self-constitution.43 Thus, there is a benefit in
terms of moral self-constitution to giving individuals the freedom to
do wrong as a way of setting the conditions for subsequent contrition
and as a step in self-directed moral development. Naturally even
where such benefits to moral self-constitution justify rights to do
certain wrongs, they obviously do not justify a right to do all wrongs.
For example, the benefits that murder had for Raskolnikov’s moral
development hardly afforded him the right to kill the pawnbroker.
Second, and more importantly, the objection does not rule out the
value a right to do wrong holds as a condition for moral selfconstitution. As Raz points out, the fact that one autonomously
engages in wrongdoing adds no value to one’s valueless conduct or
choice. In fact, Raz believes that “autonomously choosing the bad
makes one’s life worse than a comparable non-autonomous life.”44 In
contrast, autonomously pursuing good is of value. In allowing for a
choice to pursue the bad, the right to do wrong allows for the
conditions of exercising autonomy in the pursuit of the good. It is of
course often possible to pursue good autonomously even without the
freedom to do wrong, because one may autonomously choose
between all morally valuable options. Yet, what the right to do wrong
assures is that in choosing an option that is good one is also, more
broadly, choosing good over bad. And a choice to do good deriving
from a deliberation between good and evil potentially contributes to
one’s moral self-constitution as a moral person. It is that exercise of
autonomy – manifested in choosing good over evil – that the right to
do wrong enables. The liberal right to do wrong does not, therefore,
derive from the self-constituting value of autonomous wrongdoing,
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but from the fact that the self-constituting value found in freely
pursuing The Good (as opposed to a good) is only morally
permissible if one is free to pursue The Bad. Put slightly differently,
the value of the right to do wrong is in enabling or in setting the
conditions for the self-constituting value of freely choosing the good,
which requires a right to freely choose the bad. If one had no option
to choose evil one’s choosing of the moral would not involve
autonomous moral self-constitution as a moral person because one
would have no alternative but to choose options that are morally
permitted.
There is, nevertheless, a second Razian hurdle to contend with. Raz’s
position is that choosing an option that is morally good over one that
is morally bad does not involve an exercise of autonomy at all,45 even
if one is in a sense free to choose the evil option. According to Raz
an exercise of autonomy mandates a choice between at least two
options that are both good (or, presumably at least, morally
permissible).46 Accordingly, a choice that does not admit several
moral options but only a choice between a moral and an immoral
option is not autonomous.47 Raz’s reasoning is that when faced with a
choice between a good and an evil a person’s choice of the good is in
a sense coerced and, therefore, is not autonomous. As Raz puts it, a
person faced with a choice between good and evil is coerced because
“[i]f he is to be moral then he has no choice, just as the person
struggling for physical survival has no choice if he is to stay alive.”48
When an agent is faced with a choice that in effect challenges what
Raz calls the agent’s “moral survival,” the choosing of the good is not
autonomous because what other choice can one really make?
I believe that Raz’s reasoning undoubtedly captures cases of coercion.
An agent really is faced with only one viable or acceptable option if
all other options challenge one or more of the agent’s basic tenets,
deep beliefs, values, commitments, attachments, physical survival,
morality, or religious convictions. What I have in mind are cases in
which a person’s integrity or mere existence is so severely
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endangered by a certain course of action that the person is compelled
to choose any other available alternative. Thus, while the person
under such circumstances is seemingly given a choice in the sense
that he is not subject to any external force blocking him from
choosing, the person’s liberty is in a sense ‘internally’ blocked. For
example, was Thomas More autonomous in choosing between the
gallows and his religious beliefs? I think not. More’s martyrdom is
that he was coerced to choose death and not that he autonomously
chose it, because for More the only alternative path to death – defying
the Catholic Church – was, in a sense, impossible for him to take.
Had More acquiesced, he would no longer have been More.
Yet, it is not at all clear to me that such coercion is duplicated in
circumstances where one’s choice between an evil and a moral option
does not pose a significant threat to one’s basic values, attachments,
or moral tenets. In fact, where moral choice seems most significant to
determining one’s moral self is where one’s moral makeup is not fully
formed in relation to the issue at hand or where an immoral person is
given the choice of moral self-transformation. Following Raz’s logic
seems to suggest that under such circumstances the agent does have
autonomy in choosing between good and evil, and if the agent were to
choose well that exercise of autonomy would be of value. In such
cases choosing evil does not endanger the agent’s integrity and is
therefore potentially autonomous, and choosing the good would be a
valuable exercise of that autonomy. In cases not involving coercion,
therefore, there is conditional value in the right to do wrong that
derives from the value of choosing good as an instrument of moral
self-constitution. This conditional autonomy-based value of the
freedom to choose between good and evil gives reason for a right to
such a choice, i.e., for a right to do (some) wrong.
V. CONCLUSION

Are there moral rights to do moral wrong? I began with an
explanation of the concept of a ‘right to do wrong’ and with a defense
(mostly rooted in the literature) of its coherence. I then assessed and
rejected an integrity-based justification for rights to do wrong and
argued for grounding such rights in the value of personal autonomy. I
thereupon set out to defend the idea of such rights from several
objections. These objections fail as categorical challenges to
grounding rights to do wrong in autonomy. Conceptually at least,
liberal (that is autonomy) rights to do wrong are coherent and
possible. However, my efforts at fending off some of the objections
to the idea that personal autonomy is a consistently robust reason for
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rights to do wrong were only partially successful. Although I
managed to weaken, narrow, and in the case of some refute the
objections to the viability of the autonomy-based grounds of a right to
do wrong, some doubts persist, doubts that primarily turn on
empirical hypothesis touching on human psychology and the
contingent scope and type of choices people may or may not possess
in varying circumstances. Proponents of the idea that there is not only
a conceptual space for a moral right to do moral wrong but also that
such a right plays a meaningful role in morality may still, therefore,
have a few hurdles to overcome. Although not as many as some have
postulated.

